But that’s not true; validators can’t really impact the chain independently.
StakeWise’s Genesis Vault has more than 33% of the stake. That entity alone could prevent Gnosis Chain from finalizing, and thus can objectively impact the chain independently. As far as I know, none of the stake in that vault belongs to Gnosis DAO.
So even if the validators wanted to diverge from Gnosis LTD’s vision, they couldn’t without the approval of the multisig
I don’t really see how that would work in practice. If 50%+ of the chain forks off to something the DAO or Gnosis Ltd doesn’t want, that would mean that the bridges would stay on a network that cannot finalize. This is not something Gnosis can endure for any amount of time, so at some point the bridges have to move or we would need a much more catastrophic intervention on the chain. Also, 4/7 bridge validators now are companies that didn’t spin out of Gnosis (as far as I know), even if I somewhat agree that Hopr could be perceived as such following the Gnosis VPN partnership.
Secondly, it only takes ~$30M worth of GNO to get the 66% needed for a majority. The circulating supply of GNO is highly concentrated in a few hands, most of which are linked to Gnosis LTD, which reinforces this unique position. Just to give an example, a single one of Gnosis’s co-founders owns enough GNO to take control of the chain.
Yes, but also the founders and Gnosis (both Ltd and DAO) have refrained from staking too much GNO in the past specifically in order not to control too much stake. As a matter of fact, Gnosis Ltd does not run a single key in-house for that same reason.
The number of peers is significantly lower than the number of distinct withdrawal addresses ~500 peers for ~2,000 distinct validators(based on withdrawal addresses).
There are currently precisely 1847 different withdrawal credentials. Out of those, 764 are 0x00 credentials, which require a different address for each 1 GNO validator, that could all belong to one person. If you also remove the duplicate withdrawal credentials (for example 0x0200000000000000000000004b4406ed8659d03423490d8b62a1639206da0a7a and 0x0100000000000000000000004b4406ed8659d03423490d8b62a1639206da0a7a) you get a total of 1083 unique keys. So in average there might be 2 different withdrawal keys per validator, which doesn’t sound that crazy to me. Even then, Probelab probably cannot find all nodes on the network.
I also found a wallet linked to Gnosis LTD that created hundreds of validators with different withdrawal addresses, which reinforces my fear.
Would you care to share for everyone?
Tthe DAO would have preferred to accept its own loss and just reimburse the $100k from the DAO’s funds.
I cannot understand how anyone could expect the DAO to reimburse anyone for Balancer getting hacked? So a protocol deployed on Gnosis gets hacked for $10m, and you expect Gnosis DAO to lose $10m, whether they had $0 or $10m in Balancer, and everyone else walks out whole? Why?
During an incident involving one of the same pools affected by today’s hack, the Balancer EURe/sDAI pool.
Let’s please keep the conversation to the problem at hand and not diverge into completely unrelated issues.