Wismerhill, replying to your post #30 point by point.
Before the substance: GIP-150 did not clear Phase 2 of the GnosisDAO governance procedure. Phase 2 is the standing temp-check requirement before a GIP moves to Snapshot. I noted this in post #16; the proposal moved to Snapshot anyway. A proposal asking the DAO to redistribute approximately 89% of its liquid treasury, on one of the most consequential governance votes the DAO has run in years, is exactly the kind of proposal Phase 2 exists for. Even more so when the mechanism, legal, NAV-calculation and other aspects have a range of questionable suggestions around them.
More so, skipping it is not a minor procedural matter. It is an implicit admission that a fair temp-check would not have moved the proposal forward.
Speaking now as a Gnosis forum admin, on again a procedural point: before GIP-150 moved to Snapshot, this thread received a pattern of supporting comments from accounts that Discourse moderation logs flag as related to the proposal author. The fingerprint is consistent across them: registration on the day of posting, profile hidden, single-post histories, and in a handful of cases sharing IP infrastructure with the proposal author at both registration and posting time**.**
I am noting this without taking moderation action against any of the flagged accounts. The proposal author has not been suspended and will not be; the alts have not been removed. The point is procedural, not punitive. Snapshot voters have a right to know, before they vote, that the appearance of forum support that preceded the Phase 2 bypass was, in part, manufactured from the proposal author’s own infrastructure.
Now to your reply.
The comparison to Rook and Aragon is character framing rather than an argument about the proposal. Rook holders redeemed because there was no project left to fund; GIP-150 winds down nothing and changes nothing for any holder who does not opt in.
Friederike’s argument was structural. You authored “KIP Draft: Dissolution of the DAO” on the Rook forum on 22 March 2023. $25M of Rook treasury moved to Incubator DAO, the activist-controlled wind-down vehicle that emerged from KIP-44. The mechanism in front of GnosisDAO delegates here is a close descendant of the one you used at Rook: gLTD-CLAIM tracks pROOK as a continuing-claim design, with a synthetic claim on residual and illiquid value. Whether the host project is wound down or made opt-in does not change the structural family the proposal sits in. Asking whether the proposal in front of delegates has the same shape and consequences as proposals the same author has previously authored is a substantive question. Calling it “character framing” lets you set the comparison aside without having to answer it.
$22.5M deployed to Gnosis Ltd over three quarters, with the discount to NAV widening rather than narrowing.
The NAV discount has not been widening on the published methodology. The figure on gno.now/token is currently 7.4% at time of posting, and the token traded above NAV over the weekend. The GNO-to-NAV ratio you have circulated is calculated against assumptions you chose, on a methodology that has never been ratified by the DAO. GIP-146, your own NAV-disclosure proposal, did not move past Phase 2. The figure that you now cite to argue the discount is widening is one you authored, on a proposal the DAO did not adopt.
Disclosure regressing for two consecutive quarters in violation of GIP-128’s own on-chain reporting commitments.
Disclosure has not been regressing. Retrospective updating of metrics across quarterly reports has been a consistent practice since GIP-128 began, documented as such in each prior update, specifically related to financials which requires additional administration time. We have acknowledged that key metrics have been inconsistent and we are addressing it openly. That is a different shape of problem than the framing that Gnosis Ltd is suppressing data to enable extraction.
Every discretionary product showed declining or undisclosed engagement in Q1 2026: Gnosis Pay active users -20.7% QoQ, Circles active minters -22%, Gnosis Business active users from 57 to undisclosed.
This has been addressed in the Q1 Updates thread already, as well as on the AMA, and the picture you draw does not survive when you consider the data and realities of the situation.
- Gnosis Pay shifted from B2C to B2B2C on a confidential and significant distribution partnership; cashback was reduced 50% as a deliberate move toward sustainable unit economics, and the active-user tail-off is the predictable consequence of that shift, not a value problem.
- Circles active minters moved from approximately 3,300 to approximately 4,100 quarter on quarter, a 24% increase, not a decline.
- Gnosis Business client count moved while volumes held; we have recognised that Business was not performing, and the strategic update on that line is in train.
You are also leaving out the lines that do not fit the decline narrative. Gnosis App swap volume rose from $45.29K to $298.23K (+558.6% QoQ), with swap count from 8.22K to 19.13K (+132.7% QoQ). Circles went from 11,877 to 15,616 registered users (+31.5% QoQ). Gnosis Chain transactions in Q4 were 17.38M and 18.91M in Q1 (+8.8% QoQ). I could keep going. A reading of the dashboards whilst omitting these is not a reading of the report.
The unilateral reclassification of approximately 250,000 GNO from non-circulating to circulating, executed with no Snapshot, no GIP, and no public announcement.
Again this has already been responded to and clarified here. Gnosis Ltd’s GNO holding was initially treated as non-circulating during the vesting period; once vesting lapsed, the classification was updated to circulating, with a meaningful portion still committed under employee incentive plans on milestone-based disbursement tied to user growth and revenue. The denominator on displayed NAV per token moves with that classification choice; underlying value does not. Describing it as a “unilateral reclassification” packages a vesting-lapse classification update as a value-transfer event, which it is not.
On the procedural charge: earlier dashboard versions were shared as work in progress, not audited or adopted as governance-approved methodology. GIP-148 is the open track for formalizing a consistent NAV methodology, and Friederike’s reply directly invites the DAO to formalize a specific NAV framework or buyback policy through governance if it wants one.
So the methodology question is fair, and the track for that work is open. Re-describing a classification update of vested holdings as an undisclosed reclassification, then citing the resulting NAV figure as evidence Gnosis Ltd is extracting, is not the same kind of argument.
Note: The responses linked above is one of several substantive engagements with the questions you continue to raise on this thread as if they had not been answered.
Now to Citrullin’s post #31.
What are we even voting on when the Gnosis founder sway in, shift the whole vote in their favor? … If only a hand full of people actually run the show here, and don’t really want us to hold them accountable, isn’t that just a general partnership with extra steps?
The founders being among the largest holders cuts the other way. Stefan voted Against on Snapshot, the largest single vote on the proposal. He had the option to vote For and redeem his pro-rata share of the treasury. He voted Against. Two readings are available for that. Either he believes steering the project is worth more to him than the redemption value of his position, or he believes the project’s mission is worth more than his personal stake. Both are the opposite of what you would expect from a partnership of insiders run for the principals’ personal benefit.
What the founder vote on this proposal shows is a holder turning down the chance to redeem treasury for personal gain. That is the most direct evidence available, on-chain and time-stamped, that the extractive characterisation does not fit the people most positioned to gain from it.
Some thoughts.
The Gnosis ecosystem’s mission is building open financial infrastructure. The DAO’s purpose is to sit at the centre of that ecosystem as the layer that coordinates it. What that requires is teams building in the open, sharing progress and setbacks honestly, and a community that supports, challenges, and strengthens them through that process.
Somewhere along the way, not only here but across this industry, that bargain has frayed. Coordinated capital has learned that it is faster to extract from a working treasury or protocol than to build a new one, or to build anything at all. And that governance forums can be staged to make that extraction look like accountability. It works in part because legitimate frustrations within the community have not always had the governance attention they need, yet frustrations that should be addressed through that work, not through treasury redemption. That is on us to address at the social level.
However, delegates voting on this proposal are not voting on whether Gnosis Ltd’s quarterly performance is satisfactory. The legitimate questions in that area have governance tracks open, or have been invited to be opened, and should be pressed there. They are voting on whether the DAO accepts a redemption mechanism that arrived in these circumstances and is shaped this way.
Separately, Gnosis Ltd will be sharing more detail on the direction the team has been working towards and expanding on GNO’s role in the centre of the ecosystem, all of which started before GIP-150 was introduced.