Proposal: GIP-141
Vote: Abstain
Reasoning: As a former contributor to kpk, we recognise a conflict of interest arising from our recent work together. We do, however, recognise the significant amount of work that goes into managing the GnosisDAO treasury, and feel strongly that - if successful - a proper handover plan should be prepared and implemented gradually to ensure the smooth continuation of important services. Ultimately, DAO governance should set the direction, but minimise interference with the underlying operations.
Proposal: GIP-144
Vote: For
Reasoning: We commented that we felt this is an important service thatâs well-priced and with a good history of delivering as promised. We see no reason not to continue with Blockscout, and appreciate their efforts in keeping prices low and offering free months of support.
Proposal: GIP-147
Vote: For
Reasoning: To us, this is a simple no-brainer. More options for voting enables a more satisfying representation of interests. With the treasury manager proposals moving ahead, ranked-choice voting will make the selection process much easier.
Proposal: GIP-145
Vote: For
Reasoning: We signalled our support early on for this initiative. Gnosis is the parent of conditional token frameworks, prediction markets should still be an area of interest and support for the DAO. Weâre glad to see Futarchy honouring that history by inviting Gnosis to bolster its growth.
3 Likes
Proposal: GIP-148
Vote: Ranked Choice
Reasoning: In honesty, weâre disappointed in this process and feel that any success the new manager brings will not be the product of a well-designed selection process, but rather an indication of their own quality and virtues. We remain skeptical that the same problems will not reemerge to cause more upset once the new managerâs honeymoon period ends. We pray on the new managerâs good graces that they are aware of the past issues and have both the skills and inclination to fix them.
We raised concerns very early on, but found these were largely left unanswered. This is disappointing with respect to both Gnosis Ltd â who donât appear to be concerned about resolving past issues with the treasuryâs management â and the wider DAO â who had many stones to throw at the previous managers, but have now shrunk back into hibernation for the difficult task of effecting change. Perhaps apathy in the DAO is the cause of this on both sides. But either way it is a disappointing state of affairs as a GNO holder.
Weâve taken the time to carefully review each proposal. We feel that Noctua (Noca) is the only option that presents credible prior knowledge and involvement with the Gnosis ecosystem and the DAO. Many of the other managers who have credible history also have many other commitments, and track records that are less than perfect. In view of this, and our doubts about the process, we have ranked Noctua first and then None second. The remaining selections have been ranked on the basis of the quality of their proposals, the cost involved and also their wider reputation and track record.
We thank all the candidates for the time and effort put into their proposals. We hope that â regardless of our concerns with the process â the outcome will be a success for the DAO.
2 Likes
Proposal: GIP-149
Vote: Against
Reasoning: We do recognise that revoke.cash is a useful service with a long track record across the industry. With that said, there are dozens of services that integrate with Gnosis Chain of similar quiet utility. We do not want to establish the precedent that any service which chooses to integrate Gnosis Chain should qualify to be funded by GnosisDAO. To grant funding, we want to see commitments to deliverables that will actively improve Gnosis, not just sustain existing services.
Perhaps if the volume were greater, we would see more force in the argument to fund revoke.cash. However, at an estimate of $900k saved since 2021, we estimate this is less than $200k per year on average. A cost of $20k for 12 months of maintenance seems disproportionate to the benefit received here. We are also conscious that there are a selection of other services that support approval revocation workflows; we would prefer for the DAO to explore different options for third-party support (or even building internal services) before committing to revoke.cash as a funding service.
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Proposal: GIP-150
Vote: Abstain
Reasoning: we gave a very detailed opinion in the thread here, so will not repeat that all here. In essence, this deal is heavily skewed towards redeeming holders and itâs bad for Gnosisâ future prospects. But the way itâs been handled by leadership is also terrible for holders as it exposes that they either disregard decentralised governance or have stacked the deck here from the start. We wonât argue for the proposal, but we donât defend the status quo and we donât intend to get in the way. We just want more from Gnosisâ leadership here, to show that thereâs a reason â any reason â not to redeem your GNO and exit the project.
For reference, we share our recent article on RFV attacks which weâve also been defending against in support of Beefy DAO. Beefy has taken a very different approach to Gnosis on this, and weâd hope to persuade GnosisDAO participants and Gnosis leadership that there are better ways to handle this redemption proposal.
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Proposal: GIP-151
Vote: For
Reasoning: We appreciate that the Gnosis founders have endeavored to find a solution to the challenges presented by GIP-150. Though draining the treasury to buyout dissatisfied holders is damaging for the projectâs runway, we recognise that this is important to enable Gnosis to move past these challenges and continue to operate. Itâs also an important moment to consolidate holders and a direct signal as to confidence in leadership; holders would face a clear choice, in or out, and those who remain will be indirectly ratifying the current leadership manifesto in their choice to stay. We think this is a helpful reset at this stage in the journey of GnosisDAO.
1 Like
Proposal: GIP-152
Vote: Against
Reasoning: Though we appreciate the Gnosis App teamâs hard work over the years, our view is that this isnât a good opportunity for the DAO. The app lacks PMF, the rationale about Circles as a distinguishing factor doesnât bear out in reality, and from our own experience using the app, weâd say that itâs not effectively competing either with core crypto wallets or with neobank-style finance apps. Itâs a nice attempt, but itâs not worth $1.5 million of the DAOâs funding to continue.
Even if it were, we agree with the critical feedback on the terms offered. At the moment, the DAO is supposedly beneficially entitled to the proceeds of the appâs development through Gnosis Ltd. A situation where 75% of control is given away, and $1.5 million is paid out would only be appropriate where there is significant demand for either for investment or for paid services that generate revenue. The app has neither, and so the terms offered leave the DAO losing out on all fronts in order to sustain a project that sadly hasnât succeeded.
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Proposal: Transition to an Independent Structural Governance Engine and Complete Separation of Powers
Vote: Against
Reasoning: This proposal was rushed to Snapshot without completing the necessary processes. Even if it werenât, the proposal still includes a lot of very large-scale changes that are only lightly fleshed out and do not appear to have been considered at all by Gnosis leadership, Ltd or most of the DAO more generally. Too much, too fast. Weâre also concerned to see that some of the only voices that did engage with the proposal joined after it was created and have only engaged on this proposal⌠that somewhat dampens the credibility of the feedback and discussion that has taken place.
3 Likes
Mornin, your critique on handing over $1.5M and 75% equity for a product lacking PMF hits the exact issue on the head.
Where the logic falls apart however, is the stance on structural governance reform.
On one hand, you clearly see the systemic problem: Gnosis Ltd pushing through spin-out terms that leave the DAO losing on all fronts. On the other hand, you vote against a structural separation of powers primarily because Gnosis Ltd and incumbent leadership havenât âconsidered" or endorsed it yet.
Expecting an incumbent entity to voluntarily initiate or bless a framework designed to establish independent oversight over its own allocation power is a circular deadlock. Waiting for leadership to greenlight its own constraints, while ignoring the discussion thread rather than jumping in to help shape how it should work, ensures the DAO remains trapped in the exact dynamic you just criticized.
I am not dogmatically attached to any single proposal design or implementation details. If there are flaws, missing checks, or better ways to handle the transition, letâs address them. But complaining about the symptoms of unchecked treasury allocations while rejecting structural fixes because the incumbent hasnât requested them wonât get us anywhere.
If this proposal isnât the right vehicle for separation of powers, what is your alternative framework to stop these $1.5M or even 15M + 3M treasury leaks? Happy to hear back here or on a new GIP-Draft.
Thanks @citrullin.
We reject your assumption that the presence of proposals like GIP-152 necessitates some kind of governance reform. We see no fundamental concern with the proposal as raised that bypass an evaluation of its merits.
We also donât agree with your interpretation of our reasoning here: we reject 152 because the core offering and individual terms in this case are both unattractive, not because of Gnosis Ltd pushing through spin-out terms (with which we have no per se qualms).
In the case of your proposal, though you say you are not dogmatically attached to any single proposal design or implementation details, we would push back on that and argue that your efforts here seem to us to be more of a reflection of your own personal dogma being formally imposed by a brief proposal with limited engagement. Personally, we feel the lack of engagement from most DAO participants is an indication that others do not see the same problems here that you do, or connect with your proposed solution. As such, any framing of the two proposals as some form of binary where a rejection of 152 necessitates some interest in your proposal is ultimately false⌠your proposal must attract people on its own merits to succeed.
As a bit of personal feedback, weâd say that your proposal (as well as others that youâve put forward in the past) is framed in a highly-abstract way, laying out various conceptual additions without detailing any specifics of implementation like who will enact the changes, where the new state will be recorded, or how the changes fit with the current systems operated by the DAO. In this age of AI-slop, any proposal that chains together more than a few new abstract ideas in sequence, using complex language, detailed concepts or undefined key terms, is likely to be ignored or skimmed. Perhaps it would help to prepare a detailed document with all necessary information to live outside of the actual governance proposal, and merely have the proposal ratify that document and summarise its key proposed changes.
It would be also be helped to engage in some outreach to delegates or large tokenholders during the early stages of a proposal (e.g. before posting or immediately when first posted to Snapshot). Proposals that have festered on the forum for a few weeks with limited engagement are likely to be ignored in favour of newer topics and larger conversations.
3 Likes
Proposal: GIP-153
Vote: For
Reasoning: In honesty, weâre not entirely convinced that this is the right decision to abandon the validator set, pivot to a rollup after the rollup-centric roadmap has been effectively shelved, and hinge most of Gnosisâ strategy on a new technical concept developed only a few months ago. With that said, we respect the leadershipâs decision to push this and donât intend to stand in the way. We hope for their sake it does prove as valuable as they expect.
Proposal: GIP-156
Vote: Abstain
Reasoning: This proposal makes a mockery of our DAOâs governance process on several levels. It doesnât deserve serious consideration, and should really be taken down. We abstain as a note of our ongoing participation, and to make clear that we donât have an opinion on this trivial matter.
Proposal: GIP-154
Vote: For
Reasoning: The reduction is spend is good and appropriate in the circumstances. With that said, performance over the last year hasnât been great with multiple failed business lines and pivots. Our confidence in the strategy is shaken, and simply trimming back other areas doesnât make us thrilled with the budget thatâs proposed. And yet, refusing to fund Gnosis Ltd would do far more damage and isnât a viable option here.
Proposal: Signal Gnosis Guild to revive GIP-99?
Vote: Abstain
Reasoning: Another proposal making a mockery of the DAOâs governance by the same proposer. This should really be taken down. We abstain because we do not oppose the reintroduction of GIP-99, but we donât take this vote seriously given the blatent disregard for the DAOâs governance processes.