Thank you for the feedback. The proposal will be brought back to phase one, regarding the inactive delegates. The initial proposal was clear that delegates who fall below the 80% voting and participation rate will not be eligible to retain their 5000 GNO delegation.
Under this proposal, inactive delegates would also be precluded from nominating themselves and possibly being elected by the DAO.
You are correct, this provision still holds.
Based on feedback received from the DAO and input from @jackgale.eth, we propose separating this proposal into two parts.
GIP-137 will propose the renewal of the delegate program generally; there will be no deliberation regarding compensation.
If this GIP passes, there will be a subsequent GIP to deliberate on whether to compensate delegates or not. There is consensus on the need for a delegate program; the conversation for delegate compensation should be treated separately.
Author: @Kene_StableLab
GIP: 137
status: phase 2
type: Funding
This proposal makes the case for renewing the Gnosis DAO Delegate Program for 6 months. The program lays out the case for delegating 5000 GNO to 10 eligible delegates to ensure that a quorum is met on all DAO proposals.
StableLab will administer the program for $20,000 for the entire program duration of six months. StableLab would also require forum administrator access to track participation metrics.
Total program cost: $20,000 for 6 months.
Six-Month Trial Period Overview
After the delegations to the 10 selected delegates were made, the Gnosis DAO’s issue of failing to reach quorum on proposals became a non-issue. In contrast, delegate participation has gradually increased over time. GnosisDAO also saw several delegate-led proposals and biweekly governance calls, which have become an opportunity for clarity on the direction of the Gnosis DAO.
Due to issues with the Gnosis DAO Snapshot Subspace, the delegate program could not start on the date it was voted into governance; it started on April 17th instead, after delegations were made to 10 selected delegates.
Total Delegates
10
Total GIPs Tracked
9 (GIP-99, GIP-108, GIP-126, GIP-128, GIP-133, GIP-130, GIP-135, GIP-134 and GIP-132)
Overall Voting Rate
82%
Overall Communication Rate
76%
Gnosis Guild (44%)
Stake Capital (60%)
Breadchain Cooperative (55%)
You can look at this sheet for a detailed breakdown of each delegate.
The current trial run expires October 17, 2025. Key achievements include:
80% proposal quorum success rate
Increased governance activity and higher quality discussions
Feedback from existing DAO stakeholders is as follows:
Delegates need compensation to justify time allocation
Need for objective, measurable performance metrics
Desire for comprehensive tracking of all participation types
Similar to the initial trial program, the DAO will be allocating a total delegation of 50,000 GNO to all eligible nominees, who will be subjected to a Snapshot selection process, after which the top-selected delegates will each receive a 5,000 GNO delegation that plays a key role in ensuring that the Gnosis DAO continues to reach quorum on its proposals.
Delegate Track (10 positions)
Requirements:
Minimum 200 GNO voting power (delegated or owned)
80% minimum threshold for voting and rationale communication
Delegates: Top 10 delegates selected by Gnosis DAO Governance who meet requirements.
All participants are evaluated monthly on four equally weighted metrics that determine their performance bonus:
Voting Rate: Percentage of proposals voted on
Rationale Communication Rate: Percentage of votes with written rationales
Forum Participation Rate: Frequency and quality of forum contributions
Governance Call Attendance: Attendance at biweekly DAO calls
Note: Rationales now have a deadline of being posted three days after the vote closes, to ensure timely communication of rationales.
Forum Administrator Access: Execution of this proposal requires granting StableLab forum administrator access to enable tracking of forum participation rates and quality assessment of forum contributions
Monthly Reporting: StableLab will publish comprehensive reports, including:
Individual participant scores for each metric
Bonus calculations with full transparency
Aggregate performance statistics
StableLab’s Responsibilities:
Monitor all four performance metrics via the forum admin tools
Calculate and process monthly payments with support by kpk
Publish detailed monthly performance reports
Manage delegate communications
StableLab Compensation: $20,000 worth of GNO for 6 months, vesting at the end of two quarters.
Monthly Performance Reviews:
Individual scorecards for all four metrics are published
Clear documentation of bonus calculations
Comparison to the previous month’s performance
StableLab Administration cost - $20,000 worth of GNO for 6 months, vesting at the end of two quarters.
Open forum nominations with clear requirements
Review and host a snapshot-weighted choice selection process based on eligibility
Delegate 5,000 GNO each to selected delegates
New program begins with full metric tracking
Reports are published on the 5th of each month
Quorum Maintenance: 100% of proposals meet quorum
Participation Improvement: Average scores increase month-over-month
Transparency: All metrics are publicly verifiable
This renewal creates a data-driven governance framework with transparent, measurable performance metrics. The evaluation system (voting rate, rationale communication rate, forum participation rate, and governance call attendance) ensures comprehensive participation, while the forum administrator access enables accurate tracking and reporting.
The program directly addresses stakeholder feedback for ensuring a consistent quorum for Gnosis DAO during this critical strategic period.
I beg to disagree. People only learn when it hurts.
We talk about incentives in this industry a lot, but never about punishment.
It’s time to punish people for their malicious behaviour.
Re-opening this chat to opine here post the proposal failing. I see and understand the issues raised by some who think no compensation is necessary. Overall, I would continue to be an active delegate regardless of compensation because I hold enough GNO that my incentives are heavily aligned with the DAO and ecosystem. That said, we may lose some of the contributors who dont hold significant GNO. For example, I know that Lefteris was in favor of compensation, and I believe everyone thinks he is a valuable delegate. Id like to see a solution agreed to here that can be passed so that we can continue to have a sizeable amount of GNO delegated out to the community – that is the important piece here. GNO has a small supply and is still tightly controlled, so the delegation is essential.
That said, forced, gameable metrics like “forum comments” without consideration given to impact or thoughtfullness are useless.
I propose the below:
We fully eliminate the bonuses for things like forum participation, etc. Instead, we set a hard expectations cap and make all delegates removeable by a simple majority vote.
Each delegate receives: 100GNO at year end, vesting in 2 years, assuming they have not been removed during the year for poor performance. Poor performance is only tested via a removal vote, no other KPIs. If a removal vote is launched, the person creating it should provide reasons why the delegate is not valuable above and beyond “they dont coment enough”
The 3 year time frame is essential for incentive alignment, and the removal vote allow participants who may be less active, but deliver highly substantive commentary, to remain in their position. We should NOT be eliminating delegates who are busier but providing significant value (Lefteris and Marc, for example) for foot fault infractions like missing an occasional vote or not commenting in the forum.
I also support the 20k/yr to Stable for running the program, hosting calls, submitting metrics, etc
Thanks Viszla. We will also continue as an active delegate regardless of compensation and the DAO’s delegation; we hold sufficient GNO to warrant proper attention and participation in any event. However, we agree it will be a shame to lose the good delegates we have either because the program was not renewed or because compensation was not agreed.
With that said, we think it’s important that any further vote on a delegate program take place after GIP-140 is implemented, as this is likely to materially alter the landscape of voting power. We also anticipate that the existing DAO delegations will be removed before any subsequent vote takes place (elected delegates accounted for roughly half of the 137 quorum). Depending on the impact of these two changes, we are also considering whether it is necessary to raise a proposal to amend the DAO’s governance rules; particularly the current quorum rule requiring for 75,000 GNO to vote “For”, which has blocked 6 proposals in the last 6 months.
We see no reason these discussions can’t continue in parallel (indeed, we’d encourage it). However, we wanted to note these related developments, because the circumstance of a second Snapshot vote seem likely to us to be quite different to those of 137. Unfortunately, these changes may also necessarily be cause for some delay; we would certainly caution against rushing towards a second proposal to renew the program before these developments.
