GIP-137: Should Gnosis DAO renew the Delegate Program?

Governance
1

GnosisDelegateRenewalProp
GnosisDelegateRenewalProp3000Ă—1500 939 KB

GIP-137: Should Gnosis DAO renew the Delegate Program?

Author: @Kene_StableLab
GIP: 137
status: phase 1
type: Funding

Simple Summary

This proposal makes the case for renewing the Gnosis DAO Delegate Program for 6 months with the option of adding performance-based compensation. The program lays out the possibility of supporting 10 delegates, each earning $2,000 base compensation with up to $500 in performance bonuses (capped at $2,500/month/delegate).

Performance bonuses are determined by four equally weighted metrics: voting rate, rationale communication rate, forum participation rate, and governance call attendance. StableLab will administer the program for $20,000 for the entire program duration. StableLab would also require forum administrator access to track participation metrics.

Total program cost: $170,000 for 6 months.

Motivation

Six-Month Trial Period Overview

After the delegations to the 10 selected delegates were made, the Gnosis DAO’s issue of failing to reach quorum on proposals became a non-issue. In contrast, delegate participation has gradually increased over time. GnosisDAO also saw several delegate-led proposals and biweekly governance calls, which have become an opportunity for clarity on the direction of the Gnosis DAO.

Due to issues with the Gnosis DAO Snapshot Subspace, the delegate program could not start on the date it was voted into governance; it started on April 17th instead, after delegations were made to 10 selected delegates.

Total Delegates

10

Total GIPs Tracked

9 (GIP-99, GIP-108, GIP-126, GIP-128, GIP-133, GIP-130, GIP-135, GIP-134 and GIP-132)

Overall Voting Rate

82%

Overall Communication Rate

76%

Performance Summary

High Performers (100% Voting Rate)

  • ACI, Areta, mrtdlgc, Viszla, Staworth

Perfect Communication (100% Comm Rate)

  • Areta, mrtdlgc, Viszla, Staworth, Gardens (paul2)

Needs Improvement (<80% Voting Rate)

  • Gnosis Guild (44%)

  • Stake Capital (60%)

  • Breadchain Cooperative (55%)

You can look at this sheet for a detailed breakdown of each delegate.

The current trial run expires October 17, 2025. Key achievements include:

  • 80% proposal quorum success rate

  • Increased governance activity and higher quality discussions

Feedback from existing DAO stakeholders is as follows:

  • Delegates need compensation to justify time allocation

  • Need for objective, measurable performance metrics

  • Desire for comprehensive tracking of all participation types

Specification

GNO Delegation

Similar to the initial trial program, the DAO will be allocating a total delegation of 50,000 GNO to all eligible nominees, who will be subjected to a Snapshot selection process, after which the top-selected delegates will each receive a 5,000 GNO delegation that plays a key role in ensuring that the Gnosis DAO continues to reach quorum on its proposals.

Program Structure

Delegate Track (10 positions)

  • Compensation: $2,000-$2,500 USD equivalent/month (paid in GNO, vesting at the end of every quarter)

  • Requirements:

    • Minimum 200 GNO voting power (delegated or owned)

    • 80% minimum threshold for voting and rationale communication

Selection Criteria

Delegates: Top 10 delegates selected by Gnosis DAO Governance who meet requirements.

Evaluation Criteria

All participants are evaluated monthly on four equally weighted metrics that determine their performance bonus:

  1. Voting Rate: Percentage of proposals voted on

  2. Rationale Communication Rate: Percentage of votes with written rationales

  3. Forum Participation Rate: Frequency and quality of forum contributions

  4. Governance Call Attendance: Attendance at biweekly DAO calls

Note: While we understand that there is contention around the idea of compensating delegates, it is important to flesh out the specifics of how this would occur if the DAO voted in support of compensating delegates.

To ensure representation of diverse opinions, this proposal will offer various voting options.

Compensation Formula

Monthly Compensation = Base Amount + Performance Bonus (capped at $2,500 total)

Components:

  • Base Amount: $2,000/month (guaranteed for meeting all minimum thresholds)

  • Performance Bonus: Up to $500/month based on the four metrics

  • Maximum Cap: $2,500/month regardless of performance

Performance Bonus Calculation:

1. Voting Rate (30% = up to $150)

  • 80-84%: $0

  • 85-89%: $75

  • 90-94%: $120

  • 95-100%: $150

2. Rationale Communication Rate (30% = up to $150)

  • 80-84%: $0

  • 85-89%: $75

  • 90-94%: $120

  • 95-100%: $150

Note: Rationales now have a deadline of being posted three days after the vote closes, to ensure timely communication of rationales.

3**. Forum Participation Rate in relation to GIP’s (30% = up to $150)**

  • 2 posts/month: $0

  • 3 posts/month: $75

  • 4-5 posts/month: $120

  • 6+ posts/month: $150

4. Governance Call Attendance (10% = up to $50)

  • 0 calls/month: $0

  • 1 call/month (50%): $25

  • 2 calls/month (100%): $50

Total Performance Bonus = Sum of all four metric scores (max $500)

Data Collection and Transparency

Forum Administrator Access: Execution of this proposal requires granting StableLab forum administrator access to enable tracking of forum participation rates and quality assessment of forum contributions

Monthly Reporting: StableLab will publish comprehensive reports, including:

  • Individual participant scores for each metric

  • Bonus calculations with full transparency

  • Aggregate performance statistics

Program Administration

StableLab’s Responsibilities:

  • Monitor all four performance metrics via the forum admin tools

  • Calculate and process monthly payments with support by kpk

  • Publish detailed monthly performance reports

  • Manage delegate communications

StableLab Compensation: $20,000 worth of GNO for 6 months, vesting at the end of two quarters.

Accountability Framework

Monthly Performance Reviews:

  • Individual scorecards for all four metrics are published

  • Clear documentation of bonus calculations

  • Comparison to the previous month’s performance

Budget Breakdown

Monthly Costs (at different performance levels):

Minimum (all participants at base):

  • Participants: 10 Ă— $2,000 = $20,000

  • Administration: $3,333

  • Total Monthly Minimum: $23,333

Expected (average 50% bonus achievement):

  • Participants: 10 Ă— $2,250 = $22,500

  • Administration: $3,333

  • Expected Monthly: $25,833

Maximum (all participants excel):

  • Participants: 10 Ă— $2,500 = $25,000

  • Administration: $3,333

  • Total Monthly Maximum: $28,333

6-Month Program Total:

  • Minimum: $140,000

  • Expected: $155,000

  • Maximum: $170,000

Next Steps

  • Open forum nominations with clear requirements

  • Review and host a snapshot-weighted choice selection process based on eligibility

  • Delegate 5,000 GNO each to selected delegates

  • New program begins with full metric tracking

  • Reports are published on the 5th of each month

Success Metrics

  • Quorum Maintenance: 100% of proposals meet quorum

  • Participation Improvement: Average scores increase month-over-month

  • Transparency: All metrics are publicly verifiable

Snapshot Modalties

Due to the original Gnosis DAO Snapshot being limited to just Yes and No votes, we can run this proposal in a manner that allows the diversity of opinions to be reflected.

As an alternative, we will be using the Gnosis DAO Delegate Snapshot. This backup snapshot space was set up to run the delegate selection process for the initial trial run of the Gnosis DAO delegate program.

This backup snapshot space can be used to implement this proposal in a ranked-choice voting format with multiple selection options, as it is a social proposal with its outcomes being executed manually.

Note: Delegates will not have their voting power reflected in this backup Snapshot subspace because their delegations are limited to the original Gnosis DAO Snapshot space. Only token holders who hold GNO or have had GNO delegated to them in the backup Snapshot space will be able to vote.

The voting options for this proposal are as follows.

Option 1: Launch the delegate program with no compensation

Option 2: Launch the delegate program with compensation in GNO, vesting at the end of every quarter for 6 months.

Option 3: Discontinue the delegate program entirely.

Option 4: Abstain

Conclusion

This renewal creates a data-driven governance framework with transparent, measurable performance metrics. The evaluation system (voting rate, rationale communication rate, forum participation rate, and governance call attendance) ensures comprehensive participation, while the forum administrator access enables accurate tracking and reporting.

The program directly addresses stakeholder feedback for ensuring a consistent quorum for Gnosis DAO during this critical strategic period.

6 Likes
Staworth Limited - Delegate Platform
GnosisDAO Governance Summary ~ September 2025
2

Although I like to see the delegation programm to be continued I am not in favor of this proposal. Imo lower baseline and higher participation rewards would be more appropiate, also I would like to see a metric making it worthwhile for delegates to care for more participation in snapshot votes (e.g. don’t reward participation in proposal that don’t reach quorum).
Also rewards in staked gno not able to be withdrawn (like in Nicos proposal) would be prefered by me to be sure it’s a long time commitment, even If a delegate steps down.

2 Likes
3

@refri
I appreciate the feedback on lower baseline compensation and higher rewards for more participation. This is a point of feedback that can be implemented, based on the feedback we receive.

On the point of rewarding delegates for proposals not reaching quorum, you can look at GIP-134 and GIP-132 on Snapshot, where all the elected delegates voted on both proposals. However, they still failed to reach a quorum because some non-delegate stakeholders did not vote. This is just something to consider.

If the proposal is passed with delegate compensation, the GNO will vest at the end of every three months, which is one quarter. To clarify, are you suggesting that delegates receive payment in locked GNO and should not be able to withdraw?

4

maybe delegates, besides their obligation to vote, have some ideas how more ppl might participate here and in snapshot voting, especially some large holders. They might even be able to make GIPs that will lead in this direction.

I mean something like this:

although with different numbers. But maybe the setup might be not feasible for every delegate.

Thinking about the price tag of this GIP it seems a bit high to me for what I have seen so far changing since the installation of the delegate program and not sure how this will change in the future. Ofc some delegates, like you, put a lot of time in it, and this is well appreciated. But imo the main goal, to make this DAO a vibrant space to engage with, will not be reached by this GIP.

Just my 5ct…and anyway: much thanks for your engagement.

5

I’m in favor of offering compensation for delegates. It can be a time consuming task and should definitely be rewarded. That said, there are some points I would like to discuss further.

Fixing a flat price doesn’t feel right, since the required time is directly aligned with the number of proposals submitted to the DAO and the amount of discussion they might require. A cap is still necessary.

There should also be clear penalties. Being a delegate is a commitment, and if a minimum threshold of participation isn’t met, the delegate should be replaced.

Adding a new delegate increases the chances of reaching quorum on proposals. If a delegate does not vote, reaching quorum can be put at risk.

The proposed administration cost seems high. The data required to determine compensation should be easily accessible and automated through scripts, ideally fully automated within a few months. The only metric that does not seem simple to automate is communication quality.

1 Like
6

I appreciate the direct feedback.

Considering that governance activity has been picking up at the Gnosis DAO, does $2000/month base, paid in GNO, vesting over three months, still sound too costly for the delegates?

It is important to note that this proposal will be launched with the option to renew the program with or without delegate compensation.

I agree with you on the penalties front. Delegates who do not vote relinquish the opportunity to participate and earn rewards if the DAO chooses to pay out rewards. You can check out the Google sheet linked in the proposal, where we lay out how delegates performed.

I would argue that $20,000 for 6 months of administration costs is not high, considering the need to coordinate between delegates, track their performance, and host biweekly governance calls to align on the DAO’s strategic direction with other stakeholders.

1 Like
7

Paying people to vote doesn’t fix governance, it masks the real problems. If governance only works because people are paid to click buttons, then it’s just governance theatre.

Instead of handing out stipends for box-ticking, Gnosis should focus on fundamentals. When governance actually matters, participation won’t need subsidies.

6 Likes
8

I agree with @dave.

Recently 2 GIPs failed because of quorum, so having delegates didn’t even help in these cases. I also fail to see the point of the “communication” metric, and don’t understand how you can have 5 “perfect commenters” when only 3 commented on GIP-132 for example. Two of those comments were actually posted after the Snapshot vote failed.

I would much rather have Gnosis hire 2-3 more engineers rather than spending the equivalent amount of money to comment and vote on a few proposals (~10 in the past 6 months, a few of which were trivial).

5 Likes
9

this might be a better investment, agree totally on this…or pay just 1 person to give us insight in the day to day activities from gnosis ltd and karpatkey and maybe other aligned entities…most likely part time could be enough if there is some wish of these entities to have a community be part of their decisions. IMO this would be the best trigger to make ppl joining this forum and participate in decission making…and hopefully in the future also in buying voting rights.

10

The goal of the delegate program was to empower people invested in the community with higher voting power as well as to so solve the inability to reach quorum with the participation of large GNO stakeholders.

For me, it has not really been a huge success but not an utter failure either. The main problems regarding done deals by Gnosis core and the lack of transparency around these while the reluctance or unwillingness to take interest in independent initiatives such as the recent two proposal that failed to reach quorum despite all the delegates in the program voting indicates that the delegate program is leaning more into a failure.

Especially if Gnosis core feels that any money thrown into creating a better and more involved discussion in governance is wasted, it makes no sense to continue the program. Actually, let’s just create a proposal and hand over all the treasury to the management of Gnosis LTD and just revoke governance power from GNO. No need to call Gnosis a DAO when Gnosis core goes on with backdoor done deals like in the cases of Headquarters acquisition and Gnosis Pay cashback subsidies and not participate in long-tail initiatives, or hell, even the payout of a small bounty for a critical vulnerability that could rekt the chain.

Let’s just cut the clownery show of decentralization and call it a day.

4 Likes
11

Discontinue this program…stop people from milking the DAO doing nothing or just clicking

2 Likes
12

This milking mentality seems to be very widespread in DeFi in general. Gnosis Pay yields for example too. Leveraging loans to get higher yield. Very zero sum game mentality in here. Hope crypto goes down by at least 90% so we can go back to the actual legit stuff. So we can also finally talk about aggressive transparency. When people milk, they don’t like anyone knowing typically.

1 Like
13

No need to call Gnosis a DAO when Gnosis core goes on with backdoor done deals like in the cases of Headquarters acquisition and Gnosis Pay cashback subsidies and not participate in long-tail initiatives, or hell, even the payout of a small bounty for a critical vulnerability that could rekt the chain.

I see your frustration and I keep shouting it for years too. But I also would like to give you the perspective of someone who is actually in Berlin. Typically, when you talk to people in person, they give you the information one way or the other. I agree though, I am all for aggressive transparency. Just publish everything. Maybe not the employee names etc. but the numbers. This is way more fueled by ignorance than anything else. And lack of initiative and care about it. For example: no straight forward ways to connect all those company data to a chain. No simple to use Oracle providers. There is a lot of lack of infrastructure at that front. And people in power are busy with other things to actually care about it. They think it’s not such a high priority. I beg to disagree too here tbh. Transparency should be the core of everything we do here.

At the end of the day it’s all just human behaviour. You get groups, they start to become yes sayers, barely critical, if at all. Some may exploit that a little, some even more. But how would you know if there is no transparency. The funny part. It would even help leadership to recognize where the bad apples are. Or what they should pay more attention to. We are all just humans, or AI agents, who really knows at this point? We all just got our 24 hours in a day. At some point it becomes so large, you have to trust people. But that’s way easier with transparency tbh.

2 Likes
14

Paying people to vote doesn’t fix governance, it masks the real problems.

At its core it’s a culture problem. Whole DeFi faces this. Gnosis is probably among the better ones. The bar is really that low. Not to say it’s great. If you don’t foster a culture, there is only money left. For culture, Gnosis needs a leadership team that is actually clearly communicating and showing in its action.

If it’s not aggressive transparency and building the DeFi tools for all, I don’t really know what it is tbh.
And that’s where it all seems to fall apart one way or the other.

1 Like
15

As discussed on some of the governance calls, I do think delegates should be compensated for their time. My initial reaction is that the numbers here seem off, though. Overall compensation seems high, and while I support the performance-based payment approach, I’d make it a much higher proportion of the compensation.

I agree with other contributors that the main issue is cultural. That can and should be tackled in parallel.

16

TL;DR: Vote **For Option: 6‑month, GNO‑denominated, quarterly‑vesting, performance‑paid delegate program is a pragmatic way to lock in higher participation and transparency while capping spend and gathering hard data for renewal.

My vote (uncannyowl.eth): For — Renew with compensation in GNO, vesting at the end of every quarter for 6 months.

Why it matters:

  • Strategic fit: Sustained quorum and timely rationales are foundational for credible treasury and product decisions. Trial data shows clear improvements.
  • Treasury impact: $140k–$170k over 6 months, time‑boxed. Pay is in GNO with quarterly vesting.
  • Execution: Clear ≥80% thresholds, four‑metric bonuses, and monthly public reports (by the start of each month) improve accountability.

Key facts:

  • 10 delegates, 5,000 GNO DAO delegation each (50k total). $2k base + up to $500 bonus/month. Weights: 30/30/30/10 (vote/rationale/forum/calls).
  • Admin: StableLab $20k in GNO for 6 months. Requires limited forum admin access to track metrics. Ranked‑choice vote in backup Snapshot subspace.

Risks & mitigations:

  • Theatre risk: Enforce rationale deadline (3 days post‑vote) and publish per‑delegate scorecards. Remove/replace delegates falling below thresholds.
  • Overhead: Ask for metric‑collection automation and public scripts within the pilot. Review admin line at mid‑point.
1 Like
17

I think that even if there is a risk of theater, a delegate program with compensation is key to also attract high quality delegates that need incentives to engage. I have just completed a delegate training (Scroll Dacc program) and now I feel ready to engage in a new DAO if I know that my time is prioritized with a sort of incentives. Locks and time lock are good ways to avoid extractive behavior while giving a clear incentives.

But one thing is super important : Please do not limit to holders of 200+ GNO. I can’t afford this and I would be excluded from such a program. But I want to participate and give time. Can we have a system of supporting smaller delegates (even with snaller compensation). Like a non linear system for also capturing long tail active delegates.

2 Likes
18

I don’t find it helpful to start such discussions right away in phase 2 (althought it is missing the phase-2 label). While that is possible, I am left with no other option but to vote against it. And here I realize that this is not even possible because this proposal does not comply with

Must include the option “Make no changes”

as outlined in the Gnosis DAO Governance Process documentation.

So I consider this an invalid proposal and suggest to bring it back to Phase 1 for discussion.

The reason I suggest to bring it back to the Phase 1 is that I am not against financial rewards for active participants in Gnosis DAO but I am against rewarding largely inactive delegates in any way (and the proposal does a good job at presenting the facts and numbers on that). Additionally, I would suggest to disqualify largely inactive delegates from the next round or at least flag them as previously inactive.

3 Likes
19

GIP-101 was explicit that delegates which failed to meet the criteria would be ineligible for this next round.

That link goes to the Accountability Mechanisms section of the proposal which, among other things, states:

If a delegate is below these indicators at the conclusion of the trial period, this delegate will be ineligible to participate in the next Delegate Program cycle. Elected delegates are entering this program with the expectation of voting on all proposals and promptly communicating their rationale for voting on the forum.

Since the DAO voted on that version of the proposal and this is an explicit continuation of the program, I assume that holds.

20

I see your perspective. I believe the compensation numbers are fair, also considering this will be paid in locked GNO that vests every three months.

What figures would you propose? and how would you approach solving this cultural issue?