Ignas - Delegate Platform

Delegate Communication
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1. Basic Info

  • Name: Ignas
  • Delegate Address: ignasdefi.eth | 0x3DDC7d25c7a1dc381443e491Bbf1Caa8928A05B0
  • X (Twitter): x.com
  • Telegram: @ignasdefi

2. Intro

I’m Ignas, a solo researcher with the main focus on DeFi. My mission is to provide clear, in-depth insights helping my audiences stay up-to-date with the latest trends while actively supporting DAO development.

I believe in the decentralized future and it means actively participating in Gnosis DAO in every way I can—whether it’s by serving as a delegate, joining working groups, discussing any proposals or seizing new opportunities that come up. I’ll also be sharing key DAO decisions on X and my blog.

3. Delegate Communication Intent

I’m committed to keeping the Gnosis community informed with regular, transparent updates. I’ll provide clear insights into my voting choices and reasoning to ensure everyone understands the direction we’re headed and why.

4. Why I Want to be a Delegate
Currently, DeFi DAOs face several internal issues, such as voter apathy leading to governance attacks, insider voting, and voting concentration among a few active voting addresses. Additionally, they face external challenges like regulatory uncertainty.

I believe in a decentralized future, even if it seems naive. However, the current state of crypto is plagued by misaligned incentives that prioritize short-term speculative gains over the core DeFi values of self-sovereignty and custody.

Equally concerning is the trend of McKinsification in DAOs, where decisions are increasingly made by one or two professional consultant delegates. This discourages individual participation, as their opinions and votes have less impact.

To make DeFi DAOs viable, we must align incentives to encourage active participation in governance from the broader crypto community. I believe that community must be at the core of every DAO. Without giving the community a say in protocol governance, we’re no better than the Web2 companies we aim to replace—companies that view their “community” merely as users to extract value from.

I will support initiatives that align token holders with the protocol, such as revenue sharing or other methods to bring value to the token. Token holders are frustrated with exploitative tokenomics that only benefit early insiders who acquired tokens at much lower prices, leaving no upside for new investors. Without incentives to buy and hold tokens, the attractiveness and health of DAOs decline.
As mentioned, I will highlight key votes and decisions of the DAO on X and my blog, as I believe the general public is often unaware of important actions being taken.

5. Disclosure

I am the co-founder of Pink Brains, an organization dedicated to promoting various crypto projects through educational content. You can find more info about us here: pinkbrains | Twitter | Linktree.

I’m a delegate for Lido, Aave, Uniswap, Instadapp, Arbitrum… I plan to apply as a delegate to other DAOs soon, with the same mission of strengthening them and aligning token holders with the protocol.

I always make appropriate disclosures and recuse myself from voting when necessary.

6. Delegation

If anyone would like to delegate to me, please use the following address: 0x3DDC7d25c7a1dc381443e491Bbf1Caa8928A05B0

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1. Proposal: GIP-99: Should Gnosis Guild steward GnosisDAO Governance? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: May 22, 2025

  • Vote: Against

  • Rationale: I can see the intention is good. Gnosis clearly needs a more modern and efficient governance setup. Moving away from manual processes and reducing reliance on a few core individuals or internal teams is definitely the right direction.

    But carefully consideration, I’ll be voting against the proposal in its current form.

    The main reason is the budget of $76K/month for 3.5 contributors is high, especially without a clear breakdown of costs or performance metrics. I understand the workload might be heavy, and I do respect the Guild’s experience, but it’s important for the DAO to have transparency such as how many proposals will be launched? or How many new delegates onboarded? Will we see more participation, better forum activity, or higher vote turnout?

    I think a more detailed proposal with clear KPIs and an adjusted budget will make me reconsider

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2. Proposal: GIP-108: Should GnosisDAO honor the original rewards for GnosisVIP before the distribution schedule was modified (this proposal does not reward additional nodes with the same withdrawal address)? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: May 27, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: I support this proposal. Gnosis should honor its original commitment to maintain trust with the validator community.

    This is also an important way for the DAO to exercise oversight and correct mistakes made Builders team. Additionally, the amount requested is small compared to the $5 million initially allocated to the GnosisVIP program.

    However, it’s important to ensure this is a one time measure and avoid similar situations in the future.

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3. Proposal: GIP-126: Should the GnosisDAO Renew its Long-Term Partnership With Nethermind for Gnosis Chain Maintenance? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: June 27, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Voted Yes. Nethermind is the technical backbone of the Gnosis Chain. Renewing this partnership ensures continued network stability, fast alignment with Ethereum upgrades, and timely execution of critical hardforks.

    Also, the funding request is reasonable for such a long term strategic infrastructure relationship.

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4. Proposal: GIP-128 Should GnosisDAO fund Gnosis Ltd with $30m/ year? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: July 22, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: This proposal will help secure critical resources for ongoing operations and product unification under the Gnosis brand, which will strengthen identity and improve user experience. While focus remains a concern, collaboration with external service providers can be explored to optimize operations.

    Supporting this proposal means supporting a more resilient and user-centric Gnosis ecosystem.

    Check my feedback at: GIP-128 Should GnosisDAO fund Gnosis Ltd with $30m/ year? - #16 by Ignas

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5. Proposal: GIP-133: Should Gnosis DAO extend the Gnosis Pay Cashback budget (GIP-110) by 2,000 GNO? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: September 2, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Although small cashbacks may not be the strongest way to reward loyal users and Gnosis already has unique strengths such as EURe integration, low fees, strong DeFi integrations, I believe extending the current program is important to ensure continuity and avoid disruption while the community finalizes a longer term model

    Voted yes.

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6. Proposal: GIP-130: Changes to gnosis.eth (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: September 9, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Voting yes. Restoring DAO control over gnosis.eth is essential to eliminate phishing risks and protect official DAO infrastructure.

    By moving back to the ENS Public Resolver, we ensure that only trusted records are maintained and no external party can interfere with governance operations.

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7. Proposal: GIP-135: Should Gnosis DAO grant RaidGuild a 50k stipend to fund the audit of an Euro pegged CDP stablecoin on Gnosis using Liquity V2 + liquidity agreement in exchange for 15% of governance token (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: September 16, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Support the proposal

    gEURO will bring native, non custodial euro liquidity to Gnosis, aligned with DeFi values and giving real utility to GNO as collateral.

    The cost to launch is small compared to the potential upside.

    While liquidity and integrations will be the main challenge, I believe experimentation and competition are healthy for the ecosystem.

    I also featured a post on gEURO, feel free to check it out: https://x.com/DefiIgnas/status/1967530928588444017

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Date Voted: September 18, 2025

8. Proposal: GIP-134: Pilot a Gnosis Growth Fund for small scale, community-led ecosystem funding (Snapshot)

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Easy yes from me.

    This pilot is low cost and high upside, giving GNO holders direct agency over ecosystem funding through conviction voting.

    With just $40k, we can support the long tail of the ecosystem instead of focusing only on a few large projects, helping more diverse initiatives take root.

9. Proposal: GIP-132: Should the DAO pay out a bounty for a disclosure regarding a consensus discrepancy on Gnosis Chain? (Snapshot)

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: A no brainer vote for me. This disclosure prevented what could have been a catastrophic consensus failure leading to a chain split and massive loss of staked GNO.

    The $10k bounty is a tiny cost compared to the potential damage avoided.

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10. Proposal: GIP-134: Pilot a Gnosis Growth Fund for small scale, community-led ecosystem funding (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: September 25, 2025
  • Vote: For
  • Rationale: Same with the last Snapshot vote:
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11. Proposal: GIP-136: Should GnosisDAO support maintenance of the Gnosis Explorer (v1 + v2)? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: September 30, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: The Gnosis Explorer is critical infrastructure . This funding ensures Gnosis has an explorer that matches the quality users expect, ideally close to Etherscan.

    Voted yes!

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12. Proposal: GIP-138: Should Gnosis DAO fund the maintenance of NodeSentinel? (Snapshot)

  • Date voted: October 2, 2025

  • Vote: Yes

  • Rationale: I voted For on GIP-138.

    NodeSentinel has already proven valuable infrastructure for the past two years at their own cost.

    Supporting this proposal ensures the continued reliability of the tool, which directly improves validator performance and overall transparency.

    The funding model creates a sustainable, lowcost mechanism to maintain critical infrastructure without recurring stablecoin outflows.

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  1. Proposal: GIP-129: Should GnosisDAO establish Seldon Inc and appoint a Gnosis VPN Committee to support the Gnosis VPN project? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: October 10, 2025

  • Voted: For

  • Rationale: I support the proposal.

    The timing is right with the UK’s Online Safety Act now active and VPN usage surging, Gnosis VPN has a clear opportunity to stand out.

    Setting up the legal entity in Panama makes sense to protect Gnosis from regulatory risk, especially since VPN products are often subject to takedowns or restrictions.

    Having the legal foundation ready now will also make future commercialization smoother, particularly for app store listings.

    This is a practical and low cost step to move Gnosis VPN forward.

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Date Voted: October 17, 2025

14. Proposal: GIP-139: Should GnosisDAO support ProbeLab to produce network performance and security metrics for the Gnosis Chain P2P network? (Snapshot)

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: This proposal strengthens the reliability and security of the Gnosis Chain at its core, the P2P layer.

    By funding ProbeLab to deliver detailed, public network metrics and 24/7 monitoring, GnosisDAO gains greater visibility into node distribution, protocol usage, and potential attack patterns.

    Also, the $105k budget is reasonable for the technical scope and proven track record of ProbeLab.

15. Proposal: GIP-137: Should Gnosis DAO renew the Delegate Program? (Snapshot)

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: I think the first delegate program worked, quorum was met, participation improved, delegates added real value to discussions and proposals.

    Renewing it keeps the DAO active and transparent, with StableLab tracking performance and reporting clearly.

    I support the renewal :slightly_smiling_face:

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16. Proposal: GIP-140: Should GnosisDAO revamp Snapshot voting strategies (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: October 23, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: This is a no brainer for me.

    This proposal makes Snapshot voting more accurate and independent by removing The Graph dependency and adding full support for staked and liquid GNO (sGNO, osGNO).

    Clear improvement for GnosisDAO governance.

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17. Proposal: GIP-143: Should the GnosisDAO Terminate karpatkey Treasury Management Services? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: November 19, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: I’ve been following the community discussions closely, similar to many other delegates, I expected KpK to respond clearly to the concerns raised around performance, transparency, and communication.

    That response never came (for now)

    Given the current situation, I believe it’s in the best interest of GnosisDAO to move forward.

    I will vote Yes to terminate the treasury management agreement with karpatkey and proceed with a 14-day transition period.

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appreciate your color and explanation as always Ignas!

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18. Proposal: GIP-144: Should GnosisDAO support an annual renewal for Blockscout SLA and hosting: January 2026 - December 2026

  • Date Voted: December 4, 2025

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Fully support the renewal of Blockscout’s service agreement.

    Compared to the previous cycle, this proposal shows clear improvements in both scope and value.

    Blockscout is evolving from simply maintaining and updating the explorer to delivering a more comprehensive, full stack infrastructure for developers, all represent meaningful upgrades for the Gnosis ecosystem.

    Importantly, these improvements come with no increase in budget, which further strengthens the case for renewal.

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19. Proposal: GIP-147: Enable ranked choice voting on the DAO (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: January 27, 2026

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: Voting yes. Ranked Choice Voting improves decisions when multiple options exist and avoids vote splitting.

    The change is minimal and strengthens governance without affecting existing proposals.

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20. Proposal: GIP-145: Should Gnosis DAO run a 9‑month advisory futarchy pilot with $100k temporary liquidity? (Snapshot)

  • Date Voted: February 9, 2026

  • Vote: For

  • Rationale: I support this proposal.

    Gnosis has the technical DNA and institutional credibility to responsibly test futarchy, especially in an advisory only format.

    I think this pilot is deliberately scoped, reversible, and lowrisk, while offering potentially high informational value for delegates and community.

    Using markets to surface expectations about token impact will adds data-driven layer to governance discussions. If these signals prove directionally accurate, they can help distinguish value accretive proposals from well intentioned but inefficient ones.

    At minimal cost, this experiment is a good way to explore whether markets can improve decision quality.